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PRACTICAL REASON AND SUBSIDIARITY:
RESPONSE TO ROBERT K. VISCHER,
CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD
CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE
SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE. By Robert K. Vischer.
Cambridge University Press. 2010.
MICHAEL P. MORELANDt
INTRODUCTION
What are we talking about when we talk about conscience?
Part of the confusion about conscience, I think, is on account of a
certain picture that emerges when one thinks about conscience-
that of a faculty or power residing somewhere in one's mind that
acts as a sort of judge in moral decisions one confronts. Consider
the contrast between that picture and John Henry Newman's
classic description of conscience in his Letter to the Duke of
Norfolk, responding to the charge by William Gladstone that
Catholics were incapable of exercising intellectual freedom in an
authoritarian Church:
I say, then, that the Supreme Being is of a certain character,
which, expressed in human language, we call ethical. He has
the attributes of justice, truth, wisdom, sanctity, benevolence
and mercy, as eternal characteristics in His nature, the very
Law of His being, identical with Himself; and next, when He
became Creator, He implanted this Law, which is Himself, in
the intelligence of all His rational creatures. The Divine Law,
then, is the rule of ethical truth, the standard of right and
wrong, a sovereign, irreversible, absolute authority in the
presence of men and Angels. "The eternal law," says St.
Augustine, "is the Divine Reason or Will of God, commanding
the observance, forbidding the disturbance, of the natural order
of things." "The natural law," says St. Thomas, "is an
impression of the Divine Light in us, a participation of the
eternal law in the rational creature.". . . This law, as
t Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.
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apprehended in the minds of individual men, is called
"conscience;" and though it may suffer refraction in passing into
the intellectual medium of each, it is not therefore so affected as
to lose its character of being the Divine Law, but still has, as
such, the prerogative of commanding obedience.1
Robert Vischer's book Conscience and the Common Good is a
timely and important contribution to a vexed question in law and
public policy: How should claims of conscience by individuals or
groups be reconciled with the authority of the state? Vischer's
book admirably sets forth some of the philosophical and
theological aspects of conscience before engaging a range of
concrete legal questions and the relation of claims of conscience
to the rights of association, pharmacists, families, and even
wedding photographers. The book is a model of interdisciplinary
scholarship.
But perhaps we should wonder why conscience poses such a
set of legal problems in the first place. Conscience and the
common good-the two focal themes of Vischer's book-are, as he
acknowledges, notoriously slippery terms, unmoored in our
contemporary discourse from the philosophical frameworks
within which they were originally articulated. Their meaning
now frequently seems elusive and just beyond our grasp. Part of
the problem is the rhetorical use to which they are put;
conscience too often becomes the ghostly inner voice telling an
individual what he or she should or should not do, and the
common good is, as Vischer notes, often invoked in political
debates to justify whatever position a politician happens to hold
for other reasons.2
Conscience and the Common Good presents a subtle
argument from within the Catholic intellectual tradition for the
enduring significance of conscience and the common good,
notwithstanding the dangers noted above. As Vischer frames his
central thesis, "[c]ultivating and maintaining the conditions
necessary for these [morally expressive and formative]
relationships to thrive should be a priority for our society if we
are serious about freedom of conscience."' My comments on
1 A Letter Addressed to the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr. Gladstone's
Recent Expostulation, in 2 JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES FELT BY
ANGLICANS IN CATHOLIC TEACHING 179, 246-47 (1900), available at http://www.
newmanreader.org/works/anglicans/volume2/gladstone/index.html#contents.
2 See ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD 101-02 (2010).
' Id. at 4.
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Vischer's project are clustered around the concern, signaled
above, that we frequently do not know what we are talking about
when we talk about conscience or the common good. Vischer's
book is, of course, partly taken up with trying to achieve some
clarity about conscience and the common good, but I am
uncertain if he has succeeded in bringing complete order to the
confusion. In these brief remarks, I will make one brief point
with respect to conscience and a more extended comment with
respect to the common good.
I. CONSCIENCE AND PRACTICAL REASON
Claims of conscience cannot avoid. judgments of practical
reason, for that is, on the classical account, precisely what
conscience is in the first place. The substance of moral
judgments matters, whether we are talking about abortion,
same-sex marriage, racial discrimination, or the duties of
attorneys toward their clients. Disagreements about the role of
conscience, then, cannot help but be disagreements about moral
judgments. To talk about conscience is, on this view, to take on
the major questions of moral philosophy and theology: What is
the nature of practical reasonableness? What is the basis for
moral judgment in particular cases? What roles do intention,
consequences, rules, and other concepts play in moral judgment?
As John Finnis notes, one rarely invokes conscience when
deciding what to do: "[W]hen you are considering what to do,
here and now, the question simply is 'What is the right thing to
do?' There is no separate question 'What do I in conscience think
is the right thing to do?' or 'What does my conscience tell me to
do?' "' Conscience is not, then, something else apart from simply
our best, considered moral judgment in a case.
Notwithstanding the elegant summary Vischer provides of
the historical development of conscience in moral theory, from
Saint Paul to today, we risk minimizing the difficulties of giving
an account that takes seriously the articulation of conscience in
the Christian moral tradition. As Herbert McCabe remarks,
conscience played a surprisingly small part in the Christian
moral tradition until about 1700.6 "Aquinas does use the word
' John M. Finnis, Conscience, Infallibility and Contraception, 11 THE MONTH
410,410(1978).
6 See Herbert McCabe, Aquinas on Good Sense, 67 NEW BLACKFRIARS 419, 420
(1986).
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conscientia," McCabe writes, "but for him it is not a faculty or
power which we exercise, nor a disposition of any power, nor an
innate moral code, but simply the judgment that we may come to
on a piece of our behavior in the light of various rational
considerations."6
It seems to me that the Christian moral tradition has
roughly two ways of understanding conscience. For the earlier
tradition, including Aquinas, conscience is a form of knowledge.'
For Aquinas, conscience is knowledge of good and evil by
synderesis-the basic capacity to know good and evil-and the
specification of principles for action.' A person is said, then, to
act in accord with a good conscience with truthful knowledge,
which, in turn, habituates one into the cardinal virtues of justice,
temperance, fortitude, and especially prudence.' The link
between conscience-applying the general principles of practical
reasonableness to specific circumstances-and the virtues is
crucial for Aquinas and the Christian tradition on conscience
more generally.
A more recent tradition treats conscience as a faculty or as
an inner moral voice directing a person. 0 It may be that our
confusions about conscience and when it should or should not be
accorded "rights" reflects a deeper and more pervasive
philosophical confusion about the very notion of "conscience" in
this modern sense. In a series of articles, Steven Smith has
echoed this concern and expressed skepticism about conscience.
In his article The Tenuous Case for Conscience, for example,
Smith concludes that "the modern invocation of freedom of
conscience is partly parasitic on older ways of thinking that
many of those who invoke conscience today might find
problematic .... [I]f we look closely at the modern invocations of
conscience we will find uncertainty, confusion, and perhaps even
a kind of degradation."n Or as Nietzsche remarks enigmatically
6 Id.
Id.
8 SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, THE CARDINAL VIRTUES: PRUDENCE, JUSTICE,
FORTITUDE, AND TEMPERANCE 4-5, 164 (Richard J. Reagan ed., 2005).
* Richard J. Reagan, Introduction to SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, THE CARDINAL
VIRTUES: PRUDENCE, JUSTICE, FORTITUDE, AND TEMPERANCE vii, xii (Richard J.
Reagan ed., 2005).
10 See Steven Smith, The Tenuous Case for Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 325, 328 (2005); McCabe, supra note 5, at 420-21.
" Smith, supra note 10, at 358.
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in Twilight of the Idols, "'How much has conscience had to chew
on in the past! And what excellent teeth it had! And today-
what is lacking?' A dentist's question."12 Modern discussion of
conscience cannot help but assume what Stephen Darwall terms
an "autonomist internalist" account of morality, by which he
means the view that "a free rational agent can only be bound by
constraints emanating from his own will," with Bishop Butler
being merely one among many figures to give such an account.1 3
But as Elizabeth Anscombe remarked in her famous 1958 paper
Modern Moral Philosophy, "Butler exalts conscience, but appears
ignorant that a man's conscience may tell him to do the vilest
things.... [J]ust as one cannot be impressed by Butler when one
reflects what conscience can tell people to do, so, I think, one
cannot be impressed by this idea if one reflects what the 'norms'
of a society can be like." 4
For Vischer, the "moral marketplace" is the site of competing
claims of conscience in a variety of professional contexts-
pharmacists, lawyers, and physicians.1 5 But we need an account
of which claims of conscience are reasonable and which are not.
We cannot evade the necessity of moral judgment in particular
cases-indeed, that is precisely what conscience is or does. Apart
from such an account, talk of conscience will remain elusive and
malleable. Lurking in the background is a concern that
invocations of conscience can too easily become situational,
driven less by considerations of practical reasonableness and
obedience to moral law and more by occasional emotional
feelings. It is the great virtue of Vischer's book that he opens up
these questions for discussion and refuses to provide easy
answers, but it is a sign of how much work remains to be done
that anything like an adequate account of conscience would need
to take on virtually the whole of contemporary moral theory.
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 463,
470 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1954).
" Stephen Darwall, Autonomist Internalism and the Justification of Morals, 24
NOUS 257, 263 (1990); see also STEPHEN DARWALL, BRITISH MORALISTS AND THE
INTERNAL "OUGHT": 1640-1740, at 16-20 (1995).
" G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHILOSOPHY 1-2, 13 (1958).
6, VISCHER, supra note 2, at 4-5.
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II. THE COMMON GOOD AND SUBSIDIARITY
In his discussion of the common good, Vischer rightly signals
the importance of the principle of subsidiarity and avoids the
danger of either totalizing or devolutionary interpretations of
subsidiarity. Vischer follows recent work on the principle of
subsidiarity that has helpfully clarified that the enterprise of
treating subsidiarity as a devolutionary principle is misguided.
"ITihe point of subsidiarity," writes Russell Hittinger, "is a
normative structure of plural social forms, not necessarily a
trickling down of power or aid."16 Although "subsidiarity is often
described and deployed in a defensive sense-as to what the state
may not do or try to accomplish," continues Hittinger, "the
principle is not so much a theory about state institutions or of
checks and balances, as it is an account of the pluralism and
sociality of society."" By bringing subsidiarity to bear on the
range of questions concerned with the common good-including
families, schools, and professional relationships, Vischer both
broadens and sharpens the role of subsidiarity. As Joshua
Hochschild notes, "Insofar as it recommends a pattern of
organizing social life in general, and not just that part of social
life which touches the state, the principle has implications for the
choices of families, neighborhoods, and commercial enterprises,
indeed for all social agents, individual and corporate.""
Vischer's argument about the common good and subsidiarity
is-and here, I think, is the importance of the moral marketplace
metaphor that recurs throughout the book-a powerful rejoinder
to a certain Hobbesian picture of sovereignty.19 For Hobbes, the
sovereignty of Leviathan is absolute, so subsidiary units of the
6 Russell Hittinger, Society, Subsidiarity, and Authority in Catholic Social
Thought, in CIVILIZING AUTHORITY: SOCIETY, STATE, AND CHURCH 119, 135 (Patrick
McKinley Brennan ed., 2007).
17 Id. at 136.
1s Joshua P. Hochschild, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Agrarian Ideal, in
FAITH, MORALITY, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 37, 37 (Dale McConkey & Peter Augustine
Lawler eds., 2003).
1 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 134 (Forgotten Books 2008) (1651).
In bodies politic the power of the representative is always limited; and
that which prescribeth the limits thereof is the power sovereign. For power
unlimited is absolute sovereignty. And the sovereign, in every
commonwealth, is the absolute representative of all the subjects; and
therefore no other can be representative of any part of them, but so far
forth as he shall give leave.
Id.
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social order-churches, groups, smaller units of government-
exist merely at the sufferance of the sovereign. 20 By contrast, for
Catholic social theory, politics is essentially pluralistic.
Subsidiarity is not merely a "formal principle," as Johannes
Messner notes in his classic work Social Ethics, but "because it is
rooted in the order of being and of ends, [it] assigns quite definite
and concrete responsibilities, competencies, and rights to definite
narrower social units."21
But the principle of subsidiarity is often taken to be a
procedural norm, counseling "small is better" regardless of the
underlying substantive question to which one would apply the
principle of subsidiarity. It is only through an adequate
examination of concrete policy issues that subsidiarity's import
can be fully measured and appreciated. It is only by asking what
the common good requires in particular instances through the
exercise of political prudence that the proper distribution of
authority can be determined, and Vischer's book is an important
contribution to the literature on subsidiarity precisely because he
undertakes such an examination of concrete legal and public
policy questions.
One such set of legal and policy issues is clustered around
freedom of association, which Vischer takes up in chapter five in
an especially lucid and provocative section of the book. Vischer
helpfully emphasizes that associations are not mere coincidental
aggregations of individuals, though a more extended discussion
of the difference between group personality and other
understandings of associations would have buttressed his case.
The important difference made by framing the right to
association as a group right rather than an aggregated
individual right is spelled out by John Garvey in his book What
Are Freedoms For?22 The "aggregation of individuals" view is
reflected in Roberts v. Jaycees,23 which Vischer discusses
critically. The Roberts Court reflects what Garvey terms the
"individualist" view: "[G]roup action has value because it is an
aggregate of valued individual actions.... People form groups in
20 See id.
21 JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS: NATURAL LAW IN THE WESTERN WORLD
210-11 (J.J. Doherty trans., 1965).
22 See generally JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996).
23 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
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order to advance their own interests more effectively."2 4 The
alternative to such individualism is group personality as
suggested by such cases as Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,2 5 which
Vischer discusses in a more favorable light. Dale and similar
cases emphasize the potential for genuine group action.
Surveying examples drawn from family life and team sports,
Garvey concludes:
What distinguishes these cases from the individualist view is
that in each of them members see in the group a good more
important than their own self-interest. In each case the good is
interpersonal, a kind that can only be enjoyed by a group:
victory for the team, love, peace, grace. Love, for example, is a
relation between persons. It cannot be divided (like a baked
Alaska) into separate shares and handed around for individual
enjoyment.26
The insistence upon the possibility of "group personality" is
also found in an earlier tradition as reflected in F.W. Maitland's
classic essay Moral Personality and Legal Personality." "If the
law allows men to form permanently organised groups," Maitland
writes, "those groups will be for common opinion right-and-duty-
bearing units."2 As summarized by Russell Hittinger, "[i]n the
case of a real group-person, common action is an intrinsic aspect
of the common end or purpose... . False Achievement of a
mutually agreeable result is not enough. . . . [F]or each of these
groups, their respective corporate unity is one of reasons for
action-unity is one of the goods being aimed at.""
By underscoring the importance of genuinely group
personality and group activity, the case law surrounding freedom
of association and commentators such as Garvey, Maitland,
Hittinger, and Vischer provide an elaboration of Pius XI's central
insight in Quadragesimo Anno regarding the nature of subsidiary
function: "For every social activity ought of its very nature to
furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy
and absorb them."o3  There are points at which I wonder if
24 GARVEY, supra note 22, at 133.
25 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
26 GARVEY, supra note 22, at 137.
27 F.W. Maitland, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in STATE, TRUST,
AND CORPORATION 62 (David Runciman & Magnus Ryan eds., 2003).
28 Id. at 68.
28 Hittinger, supra note 16, at 122.
30 Pius XI, QUADRAGESIMoANNO [ 79 (1931).
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Vischer's account of rights of conscience and their relation to the
common good is still too indebted to liberal accounts of
procedural fairness,31 but I think he and I agree that the
appropriate way to frame the relation between the principle of
subsidiarity and contemporary American constitutional law is
nothing as abstract or useless as "small is beautiful" or a
principle of devolution.
I would extend the point to argue that subsidiarity
challenges dominant accounts of individual rights and provides a
theoretical basis for "institutional" theories of rights advocated
recently by legal scholars. As developed variously by Roderick
Hills and John McGinnis, such institutional theories supplant
anticoercion or other liberal accounts of rights that fail to account
for significant aspects of constitutional jurisprudence. As
summarized by Hills, "[a]nticoercion theories of constitutional
rights maintain that the interest being protected by rights is
simply the individual's best interest in being free from 'coercive'
pressure imposed by institutions for collective self-governance."3
With some qualification, examples of such anticoercion accounts
are Ronald Dworkin's and John Rawls's." Hills argues, though,
that such anticoercion theories cannot justify ascribing rights to
institutions.34 Along the way, Hills performs a valuable task by
31 See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
32 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 156 (2003).
3 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); RAWLS, supra note
31, at 134-40; see also Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin's Two Conceptions of Rights, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 309 (2000). As Hills shows, it is easier to ascribe the anticoercion label
to Dworkin than to Rawls:
If political participation merely secures some sort of entitlement to basic
social goods consistent with the Difference Principle, then it might
constitute a version of anticoercion theory, as the interest is a
jurisdictionally indifferent and remedially simple private good-an
entitlement to some share of social goods plus an interest in being left
alone. In theory, such entitlements could be satisfied in a benevolent
bureaucratic despotism with lots of public hearings, a merit-based civil
service, and stringently enforced freedom for solitary free-lance journalists,
soap-box orators, etc. The abstract requirement of equal political
participation can be guaranteed just as easily by abolishing elective office
equally as by giving everyone an equal right to vote for such offices. Given
that Rawls leaves most specific institutional questions to later stages of his
"four stages" of analysis, which he himself does not discuss, it is probably
best to be agnostic about what precisely Rawls's theory implies.
Hills, supra note 32, at 159 n.36.
" Hills, supra note 32, at 156-75.
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calling into serious doubt the easy public/private distinction and
the distinction between constitutional structure-federalism,
separation of powers-and constitutional rights. More
importantly and in ways that Hills mentions only briefly in his
article on the topic but where Vischer's chapter on voluntary
associations is helpful, institutions act as "private governments"
because they legitimately possess authority. For his part, Hills
justifies the importance of institutions by arguing for their
essentially instrumental value. In contrast to Justice Brennan's
views in Roberts that freedom of association is based on the
rights of the individual members' rights to free speech, Hills
argues that
[m]any organizations may (because of their incentives,
structure, etc.) be better suited for advancing First Amendment
values than the federal, state, and local governments
themselves. It is this special "expertise" (for lack of a better
word) that entitles them to preempt other governments'
regulation, not the members' desire, however sincere, to express
themselves. 35
Similarly, in his article defending a Tocquevillian
interpretation of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence in a range
of areas-federalism, freedom of association, the Establishment
Clause, and the scope of the right to trial by jury-John
McGinnis argues for the unifying theme of "social discovery"
through associational rights, 3 6 which is similar to Vischer's
account of the moral marketplace's operations. In contrast to the
Warren Court's enthusiasm for centralized federal power
balanced by areas of hypertrophied individual autonomy in areas
such as privacy and criminal procedure, McGinnis argues that
the Rehnquist Court has substituted an enthusiasm for
decentralized associational and localized "social discovery."3 7
McGinnis underscores the recent acknowledgment of the
influence of the English political philosopher Michael Oakeshott
on Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Rehnquist wrote an M.A.
thesis at Stanford on competing theories of rights, which was
3 Id. at 218.
6 See generally John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The
Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002).
3 Id.
328
PRACTICAL REASON AND SUBSIDIARITY
posthumously published in the Stanford Law Review," and
began an M.A. thesis on Oakeshott at Harvard. From Oakeshott,
Rehnquist adopted a measure of skepticism toward politics that
reflected deeper epistemological commitments by Oakeshott
remotely derived from Oakeshott's qualified appreciation for
Hobbes.39 In turn and as argued by Douglas Kmiec, this
skepticism or anti-utopianism led Rehnquist to adopt a suspicion
of national power that, soon upon his confirmation to the
Supreme Court, stood in marked contrast to the Warren Court's
federalism jurisprudence and the Wickard high-water mark of
the New Deal Court's view of national power.4 0
For his part, McGinnis looks to Tocqueville and Hayek as the
remote intellectual forces on the Rehnquist Court. Regardless of
their source, however, the decisions surveyed by McGinnis that
evince a commitment to social discovery are justified, according
to McGinnis, by the instrumental ends served by such social
discovery. So it is that, for McGinnis, associations "are
independently valuable because they themselves generate
potentially beneficial norms for society through their
competition. The norms that survive this market test have some
claim to being beneficial."4 ' Later in his article when defending
the Court's decision in Dale, McGinnis argues that
the advantage of having a full range of civil associations lies in
society's enjoyment of a range and intensity of views on an issue
pressed from different perspectives. An alternative
constitutional world, which provides special solicitude only for
the autonomy of groups with an express political agenda and
neglects that of civil association, is one where contentious
political advocacy alone supplements the norms encouraged by
the government.42
38 William Hubbs Rehnquist, Contemporary Theories of Rights, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1997 (2006).
3 See MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, HOBBES ON CIVIL ASSOCIATION (2000).
40 See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 307
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing that Congress's already broad Commerce
Clause power should not be expanded to allow federal regulation of activities that do
not substantially affect interstate commerce); Douglas W. Kmiec, Young Mr.
Rehnquist's Theory of Moral Rights-Mostly Observed, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1827, 1828
(2006).
41 McGinnis, supra note 36, at 505.
42 Id. at 534.
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Elaborating on the theses advanced by Hills and McGinnis to
defend the role of associations and the states and local
governments in the American constitutional order, I would
extend Vischer's account of subsidiarity in Conscience and the
Common Good and argue that subsidiarity offers a more
adequate and complete justification for the ordering of
associations and the common good. On my view, subsidiarity is a
principle reflecting what we might term "functional pluralism" in
the social order. By "functional," I mean to denote that
subsidiarity focuses upon the ends of political societies-families,
towns, civic organizations-and thereby seeks to determine the
goods they pursue and the means that are properly adapted to
those ends. By "pluralistic," I merely suggest that different ends
are pursued by different social forms. So, for example, the ends
served by Villanova University are different than the ends served
by the federal government, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
the Boy Scouts of America, or the family. Note that this view of
functional pluralism need not contradict the instrumentalist
accounts variously offered by Hills, McGinnis, and others. One
can proceed from an agnosticism about the worthiness of ends
served by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints or by
the Rotary Club but still believe it may well be beneficial,
understood instrumentally, to the larger society if there are a
multitude of such groups and if their associational rights are
duly protected by constitutional doctrine.
One advantage of understanding subsidiarity as functional
pluralism is that one need not be committed to adopting an
agnosticism toward the ends pursued by different groups,
thereby deflecting the charge that advocates of associational
rights cannot offer principled grounds for distinguishing
between, say, the Episcopal Church and the Ku Klux Klan.
Scholars have, for example, either wrung their hands over
squaring the Court's rulings in Roberts or Runyon v. McCrary43
with Dale or have argued simply that Dale was wrongly
decided.4 4 Such confusion is sown by adopting an agnosticism
43 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that § 1981 prohibition on racial discrimination
was applicable to private, commercially operated, nonsectarian school).
4 See David E. Bernstein, The Right of Expressive Association and Private
Universities' Racial Preferences and Speech Codes, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 619
(2001); Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of
Associations, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595 (2001); Jed Rubenfeld, The First
Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001).
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toward the ends served by any form of expressive association,
whether for the purposes of gathering for religious worship,
camping, organizing a parade, or engaging in racially motivated
violence. But functional pluralism permits-indeed requires-
some such scrutiny of the reasons for which the group is
engaging in expressive association or has come together in the
first place, even if not for purely expressive purposes.
Hills captures an aspect of this point in his discussion of
Joseph Raz's argument for political authority in The Morality of
Freedom and in Hills's discussion of "jurisdictional limits" to
associational rights."5 As summarized by Hills, "[i]n contrast to
anticoercion theories, which are jurisdictionally indifferent,
under Raz's theory, authorities are limited by jurisdiction."4 6 By
"jurisdictionally indifferent," Hills means that anticoercion
accounts of rights "do not make the definition of impermissible
'coercion' depend on the identity of the allegedly coercive
jurisdiction."4 7 An implication of such jurisdictional indifference,
according to Hills, is that "rights are not entitlements to any
particular institutions for collective self-governance."4 8 By
contrast, in the account of authority offered by Raz, "[an
authority is entitled to deference only on those questions where
deference to the authority's views will improve the consistency of
the decision with the appropriate social norm."49 For my
purposes, the key step in the argument by Hills and of
importance for synthesizing his theory of institutional rights and
the principle of subsidiarity is the need for reasoned justification
for authority.
Razian authority, in other words, is critically connected to
the justifications for decisions rather than the acts or
consequences that result from the decision. Since the
institutional rights of private government that I defend are a
species of Razian authority, they depend on reasons as well.
Thus, private organizations have rights to make decisions if
their justifications are the proper ones for the sphere in which
those organizations have jurisdiction. This creates a certain
symmetry between rights of private organizations and powers of
government: Both are invalid if they are based on improper
6 See Hills, supra note 32, at 195-96.
* Id. at 196.
Id. at 157.
48 Id.
" Id. at 196.
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reasons. Such symmetry should hardly be surprising. Under
my theory, the institutional rights of private organizations are,
as a matter of principle, indistinguishable from the powers of
the state. Both are simply instruments of self-government.50
Though the justification for authority in the Catholic social
tradition would, once again, emphasize the common good more
than mere instrumentalism, the jurisdictional limits for which
Hills argues are consonant with that tradition. As Johannes
Messner argues in Social Ethics, "[b]ecause the subsidiary
function principle protects the particular rights of the natural
and the free associations against the state's claim to
omnicompetence, it is a fundamental principle of the pluralistic
society.""
This account of subsidiarity as functional pluralism and its
role in American constitutional law prompts an important
question, though: Are the states and local governments
appropriately considered such subsidiary institutions? The
argument for a consonance between the associational right
recognized in such cases as Dale and functional pluralism is easy
to see. Indeed, the documents from the Catholic social tradition
that initially formulated the principle of subsidiarity and then
later elaborated upon it spoke of precisely such associations as
reflecting subsidiarity-families (preeminently), unions, guilds,
civic associations, and the like. The more difficult issue is how to
square functional pluralism with the apparently random
boundaries of geographically determined political units in a
federal system.
Even if the states and local governments are not "natural"
forms of association in the sense in which families are or are not
"voluntary" associations in the way that the Rotary Club is, they
exist as a matter of positive constitutional, or sub-constitutional,
law. Following the same account of functional pluralism and
applying it to the states and local governments, we can describe
the ends of such political units as those powers that are assigned
them by positive law. Furthermore, for reasons famously
articulated by Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action,
there is a relation between the size of any group or organization
5o Id.
51 JOHANNES MESSNER, SOcIAL ETHICS: NATURAL LAW IN THE WESTERN WORLD
213 (J.J. Doherty trans., 1949).
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and the provision of some collective good.5 2 The collective action
problems associated with large groups are often overcome in
smaller units. 3 Both positive law and arguments regarding the
scale of authority and the provision of collective goods offer a way
to reconcile the jurisdictional pluralism of American
government-federal, state, and local-with the functional
pluralism of subsidiarity.
CONCLUSION
Vischer's book is a deft combination of law, political theory,
and Catholic social ethics that sets an agenda for future work on
conscience and the common good in American law and legal
scholarship. In particular, by pointing toward how conscience
relates to practical reasonableness and how the common good
relates to subsidiarity-topics I have explored briefly in this
essay-Vischer has put those of us who work at the intersection
of Catholic social thought and the law much in his debt.
52 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). See also Jeremy Waldron, Can
Communal Goods be Human Rights?, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-
1991, at 339, 344-54 (1993).
53 See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE
POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 34-36 (2008).
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